Disagreement Political Theory

admin | 17 September 2021 | Uncategorized | | 0 Comments   

This book examines a multitude of explanations for why political disagreements are so vast and tenacious. The author studies variants of the concepts of “contestation” and “imperfection” that have dominated political theory: the idea that political divergences are so pervasive because of their value charge; whereas central policies are essentially controversial; that those who have very different political positions do not understand each other. He argues that we need to develop a framework that borrows elements from both schools of thought and predicts a form of moral cognitivism, while recognizing that many political quarrels cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of any reasonable person. In this context, he shows how to build empirical models that give an active role not only to the agent`s reasons for his convictions, but also to other psychological and sociological considerations. Political institutions make decisions and rules that are binding on all and that can be forcibly enforced against all, whether or not they agree with the content of the decisions. Most political theorists agree that such institutions are necessary to achieve justice and guarantee the fundamental rights of the individual. It is therefore neither empirically plausible nor morally attractive to have no political institutions at all. However, the pervasive divergence on the content of decisions that political institutions should take raises the question of how to legitimately impose binding decisions, if necessary by coercion, against morally competent and responsible persons who, in good faith, do not agree with those decisions, even after careful consideration and willingness to take the proposed measures in their favour. The reasons to consider. All political theories centered on differences of opinion assume that disagreement survives in good faith, at least in some areas, even if all participants are advised in good faith and motivated to find common ground. Full consensus is not an option. Of course, disagreement only creates difficulty in justifying political institutions and policies if we have reason to believe that there is something morally problematic, at least in certain circumstances, to force (or force) morally competent persons to perform certain acts or to abide by certain rules with which they sincerely disagree. Most theorists, who place disagreements at the heart of the problem of political morality, agree that such reasons exist, and the dominant line of argument is that it is disrespectful of the exercise of reason and the judgment of individuals to force them to live together under conditions they do not accept, at least in certain circumstances.

But even those who advocate the general concern for respect for individual reason often disagree on the strength of this reflection or on their place in the order of justification in political morality. . . .